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I. INTRODUCTION
This article guides the reader step by step through the process by
which treaties are created. It is designed for students and others outside of
the world of international law. It lays out the alternative ways in which
treaties or international agreements are achieved. It explains both the steps
to be taken within a national political system and those that involve
interactions between countries. Lastly, this article indicates the points in
the process where members of the public can exert some influence on the
outcome.
Curiously, in the midst of great quantities of writing about treaties and
other international agreements, one does not find in any single place a
straightforward account of the whole process through which they come to
exist.' Knowledge about this process is much less widespread than the
* Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School; Harvard Law
School, LL.B., 1951; Harvard College, A.B., 1948. Thanks go to Gabriella Blum and William Dodge
for their thoughtful comments on my earlier version of this article.
1. The most helpful work for one interested in how to tackle the treaty process is ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2007), though it is written from a British
perspective. See also Robert Dalton, United States, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765
(Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington eds., 2005) [hereinafter Dalton].
There is a large quantity of writing on treaties both in books focused on that topic such as, ARNOLD
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awareness of the mechanics of making statutes. In this essay, we work
through the steps in the making of an international agreement. This way of
organizing treaty law and practice will make it clearer to students and
others who plan to create new international arrangements just how the
endeavor proceeds. It will also address what actors must be involved and
what technicalities must be observed and noted. The steps are presented in
tabular form in an appendix to this article.
The process described moves back and forth between the international
and the domestic spheres. It also moves from the disciplines of
international and foreign relations law, to diplomatic practice, to
negotiating theory. The process starts with building the momentum for the
nation's commencement of international activity. When clearance has been
obtained domestically, negotiators sally forth as diplomats to hammer-out
an arrangement with the foreign state(s). The rules and practices
concerning the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral negotiation are quite
different from each other.2 When an agreement has been finalized at the
international level, it may well be that further domestic steps will have to be
taken to render it fully binding. Formal exchanges of documents and their
registration need to be accomplished.
This is a protracted process with heavy transaction costs. A party
considering pushing for a treaty should note that some sort of arrangement
or understanding other than a treaty may satisfy the perceived need and be
easier to put in place. For example, a U.S. regulatory agency may strike-up
an understanding with its counterpart in another country that aligns that
country's policies in practical effect even though they remain legally free to
change them. In other situations, private parties may join together across
national borders to achieve objectives through cooperative investments of
money and effort without government action. Examples could be drawn
from the efforts to combat disease, pollution, and hunger.
This article does not deal with matters arising after treaties have been
concluded. It focuses on U.S. practices, although the reader can find it as a
start to understanding the process from another country's perspective.
DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 3 (1961) [hereinafter McNAIR], and in works on
international law in general such as IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607
(6th ed. 2003). Another source of treaty information is the Treaty Affairs Office of the Department of
State-The Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, http://www.state.gov/s//treaty/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
2. For comparisons see Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture
ofInternational Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 324 (2008).
3. Readers interested in the treaty-making process in other countries can resort to the
country-by-country chapters in Dalton, supra note 1, at 765.
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II. THE DOMESTIC PHASE
One starts with the germination of the idea, somewhere in the society,
that an agreement with one or more foreign countries about topic X is
needed. Often, the idea forms within the federal bureaucratic machinery.
For example, the need for a new extradition treaty with country Y will be
felt only within the Department of Justice. It is considerably more difficult
for members of the general public to initiate treaty action rather than
legislation. It is also more difficult to lobby members of Congress to
initiate action in the case of a treaty rather than of a statute.4 Even a
member of Congress is at a disadvantage since one cannot file a bill on the
subject with the clerk of the Senate or the House. If the desire for an
international arrangement originates outside of the government, its
proponents must set in motion the pieces of the domestic governmental
system so to commence negotiation with the other country or countries
involved. It might be possible to encourage a foreign government to initiate
negotiations, an approach which would ordinarily require a significant ally
in that country. Within the U.S. system, the task of preparing for the
negotiation of an international agreement is more complex than it would be
within a government organized on parliamentary principles and not
involved with issues of federalism. Thus, a government like Great Britain
need only coordinate within the cabinet and does not have to worry about
two independent legislative houses and fifty state governments. An
authoritarian state may have even less difficulty reaching a decision. The
interplay between domestic politics and international negotiations has been
carefully analyzed by international relations theorists under the rubric of
"two-level games."5
A. Choice ofInstrument
As one charts the process for bringing an international agreement into
effect for the United States, one starts at an important fork in the road-will
this be a treaty in the sense of Article II of the U.S. Constitution or will it be
an executive agreement? This is a problem unique to the United States and
irrelevant from an international law perspective; it is customary elsewhere,
as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to use the word
"treaty" to cover all types of international agreements regardless of the
4. One contemplating such an effort might have to comply with the rules of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (2000).
5. Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427, 434 (1988); PRINCETON N. LYMAN, THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS
IN MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 75-97 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds.,
2002).
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label they carry.' The term executive agreement is used in the United
States to denote an agreement that is entered into either with the advance
authorization of a statute or with later confirmation by action of the Senate
and House. There are some executive agreements entered upon by the
President acting under authority derived from his constitutional
8
commander-in-chief or foreign relations powers. An argument was
developed a few years ago to the effect that the Senate's treaty power is
exclusive and that executive agreements violate the Constitution.9 This
view was hotly contested and did not achieve a victory in the courts.10 The
choice is regarded as a political question and not one in which the courts
have the deciding authority. The proponents of an agreement still have the
option of which route to follow, and making the right choice is important.
Especially in relation to curtailing political difficulties, such as not
obtaining approval from the House of Representatives or causing Senators
to feel their role in the process is being usurped.
There are several pragmatic factors that may point to selecting the
executive agreement. For example, it may well be that an agreement in
treaty form cannot be self-executing; therefore, it will require supporting
legislation. Furthermore, it will cause the House of Representatives to
participate before it can become an effective U.S. law." Obtaining dual
Senate approvals of treaty and statute would involve wasted effort. Each
treaty in a series must be given the advice and consent of the Senate; a
single statute can be used as the basis for a long string of parallel
agreements with different countries. One of the first of such authorizations
was the Statute of 1792, authorizing the Postmaster General to enter into
agreements for the handling of mail across national boundaries.12
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention 1969]. The Vienna Convention establishes
underlying rules for treaties. Although the United States is not a party to the Convention, it recognizes
many of its provisions as representing customary international law.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303
cmt. a (1987).
8. Id. § 303(4).
9. Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1226 (1995). Contra Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 799, 809 (1995).
10. Made in Am. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302, 1313-14 (1Ith Cir. 2001).
I1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (Although Article VI of the U.S. Constitution declares treaties to
be the "Supreme Law of the Land," the cases have frequently said that some treaties are not self-
executing and are not enforced by the courts.). The most striking recent case is Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 505 (2008).
12. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239 (1845).
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Authorization ex ante of an executive agreement has the further
advantage of enabling American negotiators to tell their counterparts, as the
document is signed, that at that moment an effective international
commitment has been reached-and that there need be no wait while the
document is submitted to the Senate for debate. It is easier to obtain fifty-
one percent of the votes in both Senate and House than to win two-thirds of
the Senate. Indeed, there are several volumes to the comprehensive
collection of failed treaties that did not pass through the Senate.' 3 Finally, it
would generally be true that it is easier to keep matters confidential in an
executive agreement; the authorizing statute need not set forth all the details
that appear in the agreements themselves, which could be kept secret. 14
The text of a treaty would have to be published, in order to achieve Senate
approval and ratification.
In this context, it is not surprising that executive agreements
outnumber treaties by something like ten to one.' 5  If one looks at the
historical record, one sees that there are persistent patterns. Agreements
with respect to income or estate taxes are all treaties. However, a good case
could have been made for bringing such agreements before the House,
which supposedly has a more intense interest in revenue matters as the heir
of the House of Commons.' 6 Alliances are, of course, treaties as are peace
treaties. Extradition agreements are treaties, although they rest upon
extensive implementing legislation. The same pattern was followed in
1976 for the first prisoner transfer treaties with Canada and Mexico, even
though they also acquired legislative support as to the details of the
imprisonment of those prisoners the United States received.' 7
Arrangements that directly affect private law are routed through the Senate;
13. CHRISTIAN WIKTOR, UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-
1976, at xi (Ocean Publications Inc., vol.9 1994) [hereinafter WIKTOR].. The series encompasses nine
volumes.
14. 1 U.S.C. § 112a(b)(2) (2000) (permiting a non-treaty agreement to remain unpublished if
the President deems publication "prejudicial to the national security of the United States").
15. The most recent collection of numbers as to treaties and executive agreement appears in
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1288 (2008) [hereinafter Hathaway]. An earlier compilation appears
in HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEv F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
560 (4th ed. 1994).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring that "[aill bills for raising Revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives").
17. Treaty with Mexico on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 7399,
T.I.A.S. No. 8718; Treaty with Canada on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, 30 U.S.T.
6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9552. For implementing legislation see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100-15 (2006).
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this is true of the Hague Convention on the Service of Process Abroad, 8 the
Convention on the Production of Evidence,' 9 and the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 20 It is also true that treaties
of friendship, commerce, and navigation can have the effect of setting aside
state rules restricting the rights of foreigners. On the other hand,
agreements with respect to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers
are nowadays characteristically executive agreements. This was not always
the case, for in the nineteenth century, one can find quite a few tariff-
reducing understandings imposed in treaties. 2' A wide variety of
agreements, whose effects are little felt outside of the executive branch, are
created by executive agreements such as those that implement defense
programs, foreign aid, investment insurance, and so forth. The Foreign
Affairs Manual of the Department of State advises that if the agreement is
not clear from the prior practice, then the question of choice of instrument
should be the subject of advance consultations with the pertinent
congressional committees.2 2
The choice of instrument determines the first step to be taken in the
process of working toward an agreement. If it is to be a treaty, the
proponents need to work toward an executive branch decision to start
negotiations. If it is to be a pre-authorized executive agreement, the
proponents must start the regular process for having a statute enacted. If
the form is to be an executive agreement approved by Congress after it has
been negotiated-typical for trade agreements-no action outside the
executive branch need be taken at this point.
B. Gathering Domestic Consensus
Before one begins to negotiate with the foreign country or countries
involved, one has to line-up the domestic coalition needed to make it
function. The starting point may be a private party or coalition, though this
is less likely to be the case with a treaty than with domestic legislation. The
18. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20.1 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
19. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, art.
1, Mar. 18, 1970,23.3 U.S.T. 2555. 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
20. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 668, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale goods/1980CISG.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
21. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 584 (1912) (marking a change in tarriff
reducing treaties).
22. It is usually known as Circular 175 and can be found at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (2007).
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standard lobbying practices may be brought into play to move the
government towards beginning the process. For example, in the case of the
agreement with Mexico permitting the transfer of prisoners to their home
country, the parents of the Americans held in Mexican prisons contacted
their congressional membership to urge action and generated interest of the
problem through the media. There can also be public opposition to a treaty,
as when Irish-American groups sought to stop an agreement with the
United Kingdom. This treaty was designed to amend the existing bilateral
extradition agreement so that it was lawful to extradite to Britain members
of the Irish Republican Army accused of terrorist acts.23 Sometimes foreign
interests take part in the push for action. Such efforts require observance of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act24 which requires the agent to register
and file copies of the literature it employs to persuade people to support its
position.
Finally, a government agency begins to act. It is normal to send a
memorandum around to all of the interested agencies within the Department
of State, so to obtain their approvals. In the case of the prisoner transfer
treaties, this included the assistant secretaries responsible for inter-
American affairs and for consular matters. Then one thinks about the rest
of the federal government and its essential players; such as in the case of
prisoner transfers, the Department of Justice and its Assistant Attorney
General in charge of international criminal matters, as well as the Bureau of
Prisons. The prison authorities of some states were also interested in the
proposed agreement. A proponent of the agreement should contact the
committees on Capitol Hill in charge of foreign relations and the
committees whose fields of inter-American law are likely to be affected in
order to obtain and understand their preferences and concerns.
Very special procedures are in place for involving parties with an
interest in trade matters. The interests affected by a trade agreement are
quite specific and often strongly defended by the businesses involved. The
trade concessions for which one negotiates have to be balanced by things
one gives to its partners, which diminish its barriers on imports. As a
result, domestic interests become conflicted. From time to time, Congress
gives the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements. In
exercising those powers, the Trade Act of 1974 requires, first, that the
President give the International Trade Commission a list of items that might
be affected by the proposed negotiations, so that the Commission may
23. Supplementary Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25,1985, 155 U.N.T.S. 369, T.I.A.S. No. 12050.
24. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (2000).
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investigate and analyze before giving its advice.2 5 The President shall also
seek advice from interested executive departments, such as the Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Interior Labor, State, and Treasury departments.
Public hearings should be held and information and advice should be
sought from the private sector and the non-Federal governmental sectors.26
Finally, some words about the role of the fifty states. States frequently
have an intense interest in the negotiation of international agreements,
particularly when their industries or their procurement policies may be
affected. It is a matter of controversy whether there are subjects which
cannot be dealt with by treaty because they would impinge on state
prerogatives.27  States themselves are, in theory, excluded from making
agreements with foreign countries; although, they may make compacts with
Congressional approval, and do in fact enter into agreements with foreign
nations or subdivisions of nations.28
C. Selecting the Negotiators
Persons must be selected to conduct the negotiations on behalf of the
state. In bilateral matters, it has sometimes been the ambassador accredited
to the other country that performs the task. Ideally, he or she is well
acquainted with the country and its political elite and thus, it is likely a
bargaining stance. In other cases, a team from the Department of State is
sent forth to act for the United States, including both specialists in the
substantive subject matter that is being tackled and country experts-
commonly with support from the Legal Adviser's office. Some treaties are
negotiated by agents from outside the Department of State who possess
special expertise. For example, U.S. Treasury representatives
characteristically negotiate tax treaties. Department of Defense personnel
may negotiate and handle agreements on military matters; matters that may
need to be kept secret. The Department of Energy handles agreements on
nuclear matters. These agencies outside the Department of State must
25. The Tariff and Related Provisions, 19 U.S.C. § 131 (repealed 2006); Trade Act of 1974,
19 U.S.C. § 2151 (2000) (effective Aug. 6, 2002).
26. 19 U.S.C. §§ 131 (repealed 2006); 19 U.S.C. § 133 (repealed 1930); 19 U.S.C. § 134
(repealed 1953); 19 U.S.C. § 135 (repealed 1939); Trade Act of 1974 §§ 2153-2155.
27. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REv. 390 (1998), and Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Power and American Federalism Part II, The
Correspondence, 99 MICH. L. REv. 98, 99 (2000) with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and The
Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 1075, 1077-78 (2000).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. For data on the activity of states in international affairs through
compacts or arrangements not consented to by Congress see Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign
Compact, 73 MO. L. REv. 1071, 1072 (2008).
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consult with the Secretary of State before committing the United States to
the agreement.29 In complex negotiations, the U.S. delegation must include
representatives of different departments, which makes it possible for
delegations to have conflicts of interest and to engage in internecine battles.
One notes that many countries that are members of the United Nations
cannot match the U.S. delegation to a multilateral negotiation, which may
consist of up to 100 persons. These countries cannot find the needed
experts at home or afford to hire them from abroad.
In general, it is unwise for individuals to become involved in the
negotiating process since there is a real need for a united front in bargaining
for the United States. Separate, parallel negotiations by private parties with
a foreign power may even be in violation of the Logan Act, although that
statute has never actually resulted in a conviction.30
Congress has promulgated quite elaborate provisions for obtaining
advice on trade and negotiation questions. First of all, it created the Office
of the Special Trade Representative (USTR) within the executive office of
the President.3 Congress has also specified that members of the House and
the Senate shall be selected as congressional advisers on trade policy and
negotiations. They are also to be accredited by the USTR "as official
advisers to the United States delegations to international conferences,
meetings and negotiating sessions relating to trade agreements."3 2
Obviously the process of gathering a domestic consensus, which we
reviewed above, has an impact on the international bargaining that is to
develop. Negotiators are limited in what they can offer and accept by the
views and guidelines of those involved in the process. On the other hand,
they can represent to their foreign counterparts that they have a solid
position to the extent they have cleared matters with their home forces.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING PHASE
When this domestic process is over and the negotiators have been
named, the international part of the process is ready to begin. Formal
plenipotentiary letters seem to be obsolete, but they still appear in practice
and they do provide some clarity as to who will be conducting the
negotiations." A state will generally not be bound to commitments made
29. 1 U.S.C. § 112b(c) (2000).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006).
31. Trade Act of 1974 § 2171; 19 U.S.C § 141 (repealed 1939).
32. Trade Act of 1974 §2211(a); 19 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1979).
33. The learning, together with forms of full powers derived from British practice can be
found in SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 56 (Lord Gore-Booth ed., 5th ed. 1979)
(hereinafter SATOW]. For a United States example see Dalton, supra note 1, at 809.
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for it by unauthorized persons. There can be genuine disputes as to who
can speak for the state, particularly if there is open political conflict in the
country and different groups are vying for control of the government. A
state will not negotiate with a state that it does not recognize; although, it
may negotiate with a state with which it does not have normal diplomatic
relationships. For example, the United States completed a maritime
boundary agreement with Cuba in 1978, even though we did not have an
embassy in Havana. While a state may be bound by an agreement signed
on its behalf by a group of individuals who are soon superseded by their
rivals, another state may shun negotiations under those circumstances
because it anticipates difficulties with the newcomers in the fulfillment of
the agreed upon solution.
Although there are analogies between domestic contract law and treaty
law,34 some rules about obtaining consent to contract have little relevance at
the international level. The Vienna Convention does speak of mistake,
fraud, and coercion. However, there is a dearth of cases in practice
standards to give body to this abstract formulation. Treaties are negotiated
by sophisticated professionals, usually operating face-to-face and not by
exchanges of messages. That makes it unlikely that the problems faced by
courts in private contracts will occur in treaty negotiations.
The provision about coercion raises issues very different from its
private law counterpart. The Vienna Convention refers only to the threat of
use of force. The diplomats at Vienna clearly had in mind a prohibition on
extracting agreements by force. They invoked the 1939 example of Nazi
Germany and the remnants of the Czechoslovakian state creating an
agreement where Germany accepted protectorate over its territory. That
rule would not apply if the use of force had been legitimate-if, for
example, a victim of aggression had succeeded in winning the war and laid
down terms for peace with the attacker.35 The Vienna participants were
tempted by the idea of adding economic coercion to the mix. They
remembered that in the colonial epoch, the advanced industrialized
countries had procured agreements from less developed countries that
would otherwise not have been entered into by states of equal sophistication
and power. But it soon became apparent that opening up the topic of
economic coercion in an international context would lead to enormous
difficulties of line drawing. Rules about economic coercion in domestic
legal systems operate in contexts very different from the international
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 3,
introductory note (1987); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-80 (1927).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 331
reporter's note 2 (1987).
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arena; and so, the participants were content with a separate declaration,
basically of a precatory character, abjuring such pressures. Claims of
coercion are in fact rare and would be politically sensitive.
A special rule of treaty law will be strange to American lawyers,
arising as it does from civil law concepts of culpa in contrahendo or
misbehavior in the contracting process. The outcome is represented by
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention and it is a limited expression of that
idea. It states that a country, which has signed a treaty, presumably en
route to its ratification, may not take actions that would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty.37 A proposal was defeated that would have made
this rule apply between the commencement of negotiations and ratification.
Thus, the United States can participate vigorously in a multilateral
conference and even vote on the final text, but never join it. Therefore, the
rule comes into play only after the process of international negotiation has
been completed. Americans had their attention called to this rule in 2002
when the U.S. government decided to "unsign" the agreement creating the
International Criminal Court. The purpose of this step was to relieve the
United States of its obligation not to frustrate the treaty, which had begun
when President Clinton signed it in 2000. The United States thereupon
embarked on a vigorous effort to frustrate the object and purpose of the
treaty.39 The process of treaty ratification can last for years, as witnessed
by the protracted delays in having the Genocide Convention and the Human
Rights Covenants pass through the Senate. There has to be a way of
terminating the stage of quasi-obligation during that period.
A. Getting to Yes
Much of the modern learning about the negotiation process stems
from scholarship concerning international negotiations. This is particularly
true of the analysis developed by Professor Roger Fisher. An experience
that generated a good deal of early theorizing was the negotiation of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which started in the
1970s.40 Much of the focus in this literature was on the special problems
36. Id. § 331 reporter's note 3.
37. Id. § 312(3); Vienna Convention 1969, supra note 6, art. 18.
38. Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2061, 2061-62 (2003).
39. This included negotiating agreements with a number of countries who promised not to
cooperate in prosecutions of Americans before the Court.
40. A pioneering study was FRED CHARLES IKLE, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE, 3-4 (1976).
Pieces on U.N.C.L.O.S. include Barry Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus; Developments in Technique at
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 418 (1981); JAMES K.
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that are introduced when one shifts focus from bilateral to multilateral
negotiation. We start here with some commentary on the bilateral process.
On top of the problems that make international negotiation more complex
than the domestic version is the difficulty of seeing the other side's point of
view. To begin, there is usually another language involved and the parties
must decide, at an early stage, which language the negotiations are to be
conducted. Americans have, in a sense, an advantage because so many
foreign officials know and speak English and are willing to use it. But lack
of knowledge of the foreign tongue causes one to miss some of the signals
that the foreign tongue conveys. Beyond language differences, there are
cultural differences, as comparative studies demonstrate. An American is
apt to operate with a different set of priorities than a citizen of a Muslim
state in Southeast Asia. This may cause opportunities to be missed. One
side may not understand what proposals will be acceptable to the other side.
But there can also be opportunity-one country may put a higher value on
prestige, for example, and be willing to make concessions that have a
financial cost. Cultures differ in their degree of risk aversion and their
concerns may have to be accommodated.4' While power and interest drive
these negotiations, there is a space within which diplomatic skill (tact) can
make progress and where blunter tactics would cause the parties to pick up
their papers and go home.
There is also a body of literature that tries to determine what the result
of negotiations will be-the equilibrium position. It proceeds from an
assumption that states act as rational decision-makers, taking into account
their material interests. This literature sometimes undervalues the influence
that other considerations, psychological, cultural, and institutional, play in
these calculations. There is a strong influence and desire not to be regarded
in international circles as an "outsider" who does not cooperate with the
community. This runs in parallel with the thought that being a negative
force with regard to the development of international law damages a
nation's standing. More narrowly viewed, country A's stubbornness
regarding a treaty that country B wants to execute can come back to haunt
A when it is A's turn to ask for something from B. Of course, these
negative forces are less damaging than those unleashed when a country
commits itself to a treaty and then breaches it.
When relations between the two states are particularly strained, it may
be wise to consider calling upon an intermediary to help. In some cases, an
intermediary is already in place because an "interest section" in some third
SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1984); INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 5 (Victor
Kremenyuk ed., 1991).
41. MICHAEL MORRIS & MICHELE GELFAND, Cultural Differences and Cognitive Dynamics,
in HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 46-47 (Michele Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
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country's embassy has been replaced in lieu of the quarreling states'
embassies. Since 1962, Cuba has been the most prominent example in
American practice,42 but the same situation has prevailed in regard to other
countries, such as Libya. A classic example is the involvement of Algeria
in settling the differences between the United States and Iran. These
differences included the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, responses
by the United States, including the freezing of Iranian assets within the
United States, and the authorizing of lawsuits against Iran because of the
attachment of those assets. The so-called Algiers Accords resulted from
these parties' interactions; one observes that the final arrangement took the
form of declarations by the United States and Iran without the two nations'
signatures appearing on a common document.43
B. Multilateral Negotiation
International negotiations can involve an extraordinarily large number
of parties. Some of them implicate all 192-member states of the United
Nations. It is rare that a private negotiation will involve all 192 members-
in some instances we find hundreds of potential lenders involved in the
same deal, but their interests run in parallel and they can fairly be
represented by a single agent. Charles Brower identified several other
causes of increasing difficulty in concluding multilateral agreements. He
pointed to the growing number of states with democratic governments, the
sharp inter-state conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War, the
regulation of more and more issues, and the rise of non-governmental
organizations." Various mechanisms have been invented to disentangle the
multinational problem. They start out with the idea that the end result
cannot be by majority vote, but requires a consensus. There is no
legislative power involved; a treaty is an agreement and not a statute. All
of the solutions begin with the idea that the task of producing a working
text to serve as the basis for detailed "horse-trading" must be delegated.
The process followed by the International Law Commission (ILC) is to
refer the original drafting task to an expert in the field. The draft is then
examined and debated within the Commission, all of whom are lawyers.
The paper that is hammered-out within the Commission then goes to a
42 The agreement on interest sections was negotiated in 1977. United States Treaty with
Cuba, Establishment of Interests Section, May 30, 1977, 30.2 U.S.T. 2101, T.I.A.S. No. 9313.
43. The official documents are collected in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 418-32 (1981) and 20 I.L.M.
223-40 (1981).
44. CHARLES BROWER, THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING: THE CURRENT STATUS OF
CHALLENGES TO AND REFORMS NEEDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 75-77 (Vera
Gowlland Debbas ed., 2000).
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diplomatic conference for further debate and amendment. One notices that
one is dealing with a codification of international law, which is supposedly
a more objective operation; however, these so-called codifications do
contain controversial provisions that directly affect the interests of states
and require bargaining. The ILC was able to produce a set of law of the sea
(LOS) conventions at Geneva in the 1950s, although it had to leave some
issues-such as the width of the territorial sea-unsettled. It was clear that
the ILC would not be able to handle the next LOS round of negotiations
twenty years later. The last large scale multinational national agreement is
the one which created the International Criminal Court, signed in 2000. It
was produced by a diplomatic conference that held numerous sessions in
Rome.45
Some groups of countries work together and develop bargaining
stances through a process of caucusing and coalition-forming. This can be
complex, involving decisions as to the selection of partners and the degree
to which national independence should be sacrificed for the sake of
collective power. The Group of 77, a loose coalition of developing
countries, frequently represents less developed countries at conferences. A
new set of procedures was developed for the LOS. In that case, topics were
referred to various committees, so that these committees could create texts
that would be assembled for the final product. The selection of personnel is
a sensitive and complex issue. For consensus to develop, the committees
must not be seen as representing the interests of the rich, developed
countries. The chair, in particular, should be somebody who enjoys a
widespread reputation for competence and even-handedness. Ambassador
Tommy Koh from Singapore was impressive in his function as the chair
because he developed principles for competence and even-handedness.
Votes should not be required in the committee's work; therefore, this may
mean bracketing controversial parts of the text for discussion in the broader
assembly.
In some multilateral negotiations, a significant role is played by non-
governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-state
actors. Some NGOs have a degree of official recognition, in that they have
received consultative status under Article 71 of the U.N. Charter, giving
them limited rights to be present, to suggest texts, and to make their views
known as the multilateral negotiations progress.4 At times, they have
played a disruptive role, as when they organized demonstrations against
45. LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-45 (2002); Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 3-4 (1999).
46. For an introduction to NGOs see Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 348 (2006).
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negotiating sessions of the World Trade Organization, at both Seattle and
Cancun.
Special negotiating techniques have been developed within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through the successive
rounds that began in the 1950s. They necessarily differ from practices
within the traditional bilateral tariff negotiations; particularly because any
concession made by country X is extended through the most favored nation
clause to all of the other contracting parties. Normally a major importer of
a product will make a tentative offer to diminish trade barriers on product
A, relying on receiving concessions from various countries for its exports of
product B. The simultaneous presence of all the GATT parties makes it
easier to coordinate those concessions.
At the end of the negotiations, there is typically a vote to adopt the text
which, according to the Vienna Convention Article 9 Section 2, would
ordinarily be by a two-thirds vote. The states, then, would likely sign the
document. In many cases the text is presented in several languages, often
accompanied by a provision that each of them is equally authentic. It is
common to adopt a Final Act, which may include, besides the text, the
names of the countries and their delegates.4 8 Remember that a state may,
after going through this entire process, decline to sign or to ratify. It may
pay a certain political price for this. The United States was sharply
criticized for failing to adhere to the agreements on the LOS, global
warming, and land mines. However, the strength of the United States'
international position enabled it to endure the resulting storms.
Multilateral negotiations tend to produce a substantial body of
materials that would be known as legislative history on the domestic front.
They are termed travaux prdparatoires in international parlance. Article 32
of the Vienna Convention authorizes resort to such materials when clarity
does not emerge from the text. While such use is very much in the
American tradition, courts of other countries-conspicuously Great
Britain-have not permitted reference to their own legislative history and
have been slow to tolerate reference to travaux prdparatoires.50 Note that
sometimes a state becomes committed to a multilateral treaty without
having participated in the negotiations that led to it, a process known as
47. Vienna Convention 1969, supra note 6, art. 2, § 9.
48. For materials on final acts see SATOW, supra note 33, ch. 31.
49. Vienna Convention 1969, supra note 6, art. 32.
50. McNAIR, supra note 1, at 418. For more recent authority see Fothergill v. Monarch
Airlines, [1981] A.C. 251, 70 (H.L. 1980), available at
http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/ArbitrationOlderReports/Fothergil%20/20Monarch%2Airli
nes%201980.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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accession. The Warsaw Convention,si on limiting damages for aircraft
accidents on international flights, stands as an example. Accession is rare
for the United States, but common among states that have achieved
independence in recent years. New states typically begin by acceding to the
New York Convention on Arbitration and the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
IV. THE POST-SIGNATURE STAGE
A. Advice, Consent, and other Action by Congress
When the agreement is signed, that may be the end of the process.
That would be the case with an executive agreement that had been
previously authorized by Congress or was undertaken under the President's
foreign relations power. Indeed, people not accustomed to the international
law processes tend to assume that "signing" is final. But the signing is not
the last step if the agreement is, in American terms, a treaty. Also, in many
multilateral situations, the parties sign ad referendum, meaning that they are
not bound until more has been accomplished. In the United States, the
process involves obtaining advice and consent from the Senate. This
process is often erroneously referred to as "ratification." That term is only
properly applied to a president's international action which takes place after
the Senate procedures are completed.
In U.S. practice, the President refers the proposed treaty to the Senate
along with a Message of Transmittal explaining the document and the
reasons consent is sought.52 The transmission is then referred to the
appropriate committee. This is typically the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, even if the subject matter is the adjustment of income taxation,
a topic which would normally be of interest to other committees, including
the House Committee on Appropriations. The committee schedules
hearings at which interested members of the public can express their
opinions alongside officials of the executive branch. The result would
ordinarily be a committee report to the Senate which would then debate the
matter and vote-which requires an approval by two-thirds vote of the
senators then present. Remember that the history of the treaty process
brings forth many examples of treaties that died along the way. One
possibility is that the Senate may insist upon reservations being inserted. In
51. 49 Stat. 3000 (1946); Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, TS No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934).
52. These documents bear a designation as "Senate Executive Document X."
53. For a compendium see WIKTOR, supra note 13, at xi.
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the case of a bilateral treaty, this calls for renegotiation with the other party.
In the case of a multilateral arrangement, the question then arises whether
the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. It is
important whether other countries register objections to the reservation.5 4
It is a matter of dispute whether the documents generated during this
congressional process can be used in interpreting the agreement. The
negative case is that they are internal to the United States and cannot fairly
be used in regard to other signatories.55 Practice indicates that there is a
cautious use of such papers. Sometimes the references simply bring the
researcher, who made the statements, to the international negotiations.
If the chosen method for the agreement has been a legislative-
executive agreement that was not authorized in advance, the negotiated
agreement must be submitted to Congress for its approval. This
arrangement looks so much like the advice and consent to a treaty (though
requiring only a simple majority vote in both houses) that it has been the
focus of advocates who believe that such an agreement should not be
substituted for a treaty. With respect to trade agreements, there has
developed a special process termed "the fast track" or more recently,
"Trade Promotion Authority." Under the various statutes that paved the
way for approval of trade agreements, Congress committed itself to the
following: there will be no amendment of the agreement since that would
compel the executive to renegotiate the deal with all the parties, committees
must discharge the bill within forty-five days thus preventing them from
bottling it up, and there must be a vote on the floor of each house within a
specified number of days.
B. Ratification
If the Senate has consented, the President is now free to ratify the
treaty; it is not, however, his duty to do so and sometimes the process is
stopped at this point. The President may, for instance, be unwilling to
proceed with ratification if the Senate has imposed reservations. In the case
of a bilateral accord, ratification is simply a matter of transmitting to the
other party a copy of the document as signed and accompanied by a
54. On reservations and the effect of objections to them by other states see Vienna Convention
1969, supra note 6, arts. 19-23. The Senate may also attach "understandings" and "declarations." On
their effect see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 314 (1987).
55. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a response
see Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 546 (1989).
56. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 90-93 (5th ed. 2008); Hal S. Shapiro, Fast Track: A Legal,
Historical and PoliticalAnalysis, J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 153-54 (2006).
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presidential statement reciting the advice and consent of the Senate along
with the President's own concurrence. In former years, the document
annexed to the text of the treaty also proclaimed that it is now valid and
binding. The case of a multinational agreement is more complicated, at
least from a secretarial perspective, since here, it would be a flurry of
transmissions if every state had to send a copy to every other state in the
circuit. It is part of the boilerplate of multilateral agreements to designate a
particular agency as the depositary. Typically it is the Secretary General of
the United Nations, although sometimes a specialized agency, such as the
International Labor Organization or a member state, performs the function.
Commonly, the agreement will state that it becomes legally binding when a
specified number of states have deposited their ratifications. The
depositary determines when that point has been reached. It is also the
function of the depositary to transmit submitted reservations along with
ratifications to the other signatories so that they can react accordingly.
Even though a treaty upon ratification is binding on the United States
under international law, if it is not self-executing, a further internal step
may have to be taken; the enactment of legislation to make it effective as
internal law.57
C. Filing and Publication
At the very tail end of the proceedings comes the matter of filing.
Internally, the Case Actss requires the Department of State to file with
Congress copies of all agreements within sixty days of their conclusion. It
has been assumed that this would be accompanied by prompt publication to
make them readily available to the public. However, misconceived notions
of economy have prevented the publication from happening, so that finding
official hard copies of recent agreements can be a frustrating experience.5 9
There are also matters of paper-shuffling at the international level. Article
102 of the U.N. Charter provides for the registration of agreements with the
Secretary General, and further states that an agreement not so registered
will not be taken into account by the United Nations. Treaties so registered
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 494, 505.
58. 1 U.S.C. § I 12b (2000).
59. The official Treaties and other International Acts Series of pamphlets currently runs only
to 1997. They are later published in the bound volumes called United States Treaties and Other
international Agreements. The Department of State publishes annually a volume called Treaties in
Force which indexes treaties and indicates what countries are currently parties to them. There is an
unofficial hardcover series, CONSOLIDATED TREATIES & INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 23 (Erwin C.
Surrency. ed., vol.1 1990) (1991). For an explanation of treaty databases see Hathaway, supra note 15,
at 1358-61.
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are published in the United Nations Treaty Series, which now runs to more
than 2000 volumes.60
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have laid out in chronological order the steps
needed to bring an international agreement into effect. They have also
indicated where outsiders can bring to bear whatever influence they have on
the process. They have not sought to deal with questions about what
happens after an agreement enters into force. That might include internal or
external disputes involving the United States system about what a treaty
really signifies. These disputes might also include denunciation of a treaty
or charges that there has been a grave breach of the treaty. Another
possibility would be that Congress might enact legislation that varied the
terms of an agreement.
60. The U.N.T.S. cannot be taken as an accurate database for treaties in force as some states
neglect to register treaties and treaties no longer in force are not deleted.
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VI. APPENDIX
Charts Showing Steps in Treaty Process:
A. An Article II Treaty
1. Gathering consensus in the U.S. government-
Circular 175 process
2. Authorization to negotiate, naming of Representatives
3. International negotiation
4. Conclusion of negotiation-final act, signature, etc.
5. Transmission by President to Senate
6. Committee hearings, floor debate, and Senate vote
7. Ratification by exchange with foreign state(s)
B. Pre-Approved Executive Agreement
1. Gathering consensus in the U.S. government-
Circular 175 process
2. Filing of bills in Senate and House
3. Committee hearings and floor votes
4. Transmission of bill to President and signature
5. Designation of negotiators
6. International negotiation
7. Conclusion of negotiation-final act, signature, etc.
C. Non Pre-approved Executive Agreement
1. Gathering consensus in the U.S. government-
Circular 175 process
2. Designation of negotiators
3. International negotiation
4. Conclusion of negotiation-final act, signature, etc.
5. Filing of bills in Senate and House
6. Committee hearings, floor debates, and votes in both
houses of congress
7. Transmission to President for signature
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